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Note: see Italy’s EURO 2012 preview for context
The kings of two footballing philosophies locked horns in the opening Group C game of Euro 2012: Catenaccio and Tiki-Taka; Italy and Spain.
The Catenaccio philosophy is one associated with a highly organised and effective defensive tactic that focuses on taming the opponent’s attacks and in turn preventing any credible goal scoring opportunities. In Catenaccio, it is typical that the role of a sweeper, libero or verrouilleur is given a pivotal role in both defensive organisation and playing the ball out from the back – a commanding general.
In truth, the profession of a libero or verrouilleur is a dying role in modern-day football tactics – the likes of Franz Beckenbauer, Gaetano Scirea and Franco Baresi are now widely regarded as football antiquity. So eye brows should have been raised when Cesare Prandelli opted to move away from his preferred 4-3-1-2 to an italian suited 3-5-2, made using two wing backs and a libero(Danielle De Rossi), while instructing Juventus attacking midfielder Giaccherini to play out of position on his international début at left wing-back (a player who only four years a go was fighting relegation in Serie C2). Much of the prematch attention should have been directed towards Prandelli’s courage to employ such a tactic against the world champions.
Italy (3-5-2): Buffon, Maggio, Chiellini, Bonucci, Motta, Marchisio, Giaccherini, De Rossi, Pirlo, Balotelli, Cassano
Yet Vincente del Bosque had other ideas. La Furia Roja looked set to take the rule book of formations and simply tear it up, by announcing a team that seemingly was set up to play a 4-6-0 formation:
“When we got into the locker room we were joking around looking at the team sheet, as we couldn’t find a striker” reveals the Azzurri’s newly appointed Libero, Danielle De Rossi.
Guillem Balague (spanish football expert) argued that del Bosque had simply taken inspiration from an already widely praised and accepted Barcelona tactic:
“How many strikers do you think Barcelona use? No strikers means that there’s not one referent point, but five different mobile reference points…set formations are an obsolete way to look at football …centre backs prefer a number 9 due to familiarity of being able to mark them”
Balague went on to claim that del Bosque had set the team up like so, as a tactical response to both Italy’s likelihood of employing a Catenaccio strategy:
“Spain will find a team that will kill spaces. You combat that with dynamism, 2v1’s, short passing and involvement, hence no striker – [this is the] logical progression of style”
Spain looked to be playing to their own strengths, as a response to both their opponent’s set up, their own abilities and as a response to a lack of David Villa. With much of the attack built around a successful Barcelona team and the influence of the Barca-influenced infamous ‘rondo’ it seemed as if it was only a natural progression of formation in a bid to force what they do best: keep ball. The Rondo is essentially a fiercely competitive game of ‘piggy in the middle’ that has become tradition at Barca’s training ground and is often used to intimidate any new arrivals at the club.
However, it seems that there was actually less preparation for this tactic than one would expect, as Javi Matallanas revealed to Guillem Balague that Cesc Fabregas was only made aware of his role as a ‘false number 9’ three hours before kick off.
With a throw-back libero, a false number 9, a Balotelli-Cassano strike partnership, the battle of the regista’s (Xavi and Pirlo) and the clash of the two polar footballing philosophies this match up was beginning to look more and more like it was going to be one of the classics of Euro history.
Spain (4-6-0?): Casillas, Arbeloa, Piqué, Ramos, Alba; Busquets, Xabi Alonso, Xavi; Silva, Iniesta, Fàbregas
As expected the spanish dominated possession (65.8%) and played 646 passes to Italy’s 292 passes. Xavi, whom Gary Breen said would “keep the ball off you in a phone box”, was involved in 197 of Spain’s passes (played or received) and created 8 goal scoring opportunities for the striker-less tiki-taka side. Busquets was another player central to La Roja’s possession play as he was involved in 183 passes and boasted a 92% pass rate (the highest of anyone on the field).
Spain’s unnamed formation allowed the spanish to play 172 passes in the final third compared to Italy’s 48, a theme than ran throughout the game.
However, Italy pressed high, boasted a 100% tackling rate (15/15) and provided Spain with a problem as they didn’t begin the game with many players who could run in behind Italy’s back line. The libero role was played well by De Rossi who relieved Pirlo of the play-making pressure, with De Rossi deciding the direction of play more often than not.
It was noted that while Pirlo played the majority of his passes to the centralised players, De Rossi focused much of his passes down the flanks, into wider positions – this seemed to be an obvious tactical employment.
Half time came with the score at 0-0, but as one of the most technical and interesting duels of the competition so far.
The second half started, promising more of the same, only this time the first real opportunity came early in the half. A frustrated Mario Balotelli, pressing high up the field managed to steal the ball from Sergio Ramos and began the charge towards Casillas on his goal line. All of Spain and Italy held their breath as Balotelli’s charge towards the goal began to turn into a casual stroll towards Casillas as if a Playstation controller was running out of battery. As Balotelli began to see the world around him in slow motion Ramos had caught up with him to put in a last-ditch tackle. What just happened?!
Prandelli, clearly not happy with Balotelli’s performance and perhaps concerned about the booking Mario had received earlier on in the first half, decided to bring on Di Natale in his place, leaving Balotelli to think over how on earth he hadn’t had a shot moments before.
Up stepped Andrea Pirlo to stake his claim as one of the world’s best – skipping past his Spanish marker on the half way line and changing the pace of the game to feed through Di Natale, who put away his first shot of the game and made his mark immediately.
But the action packed opening to the second half was not finished just yet. Three minutes later Spain managed to get in behind De Rossi with a clever run from Cesc Fabregas who finished cooly – to complete the curse commentator Jon Champion had put on the game where he opened the game with the words “there is no striker, there’s only Fabregas” much like Tim Lovejoy’s cursed words of “Don’t worry, it’s only Ray Parlour”, moments before the midfielder hit an unstoppable shot from 30 yards in the 2002 FA Cup final win against Chelsea.
Di Natale had one more undeniable opportunity with an agonisingly missed volley inside the box from a clever Giovinco ball before the game returned to it’s status quo of Spanish control in the final third, in a duel that looked destined for a testing draw there after – aside from the two missed Torres one on one opportunities to put the game to rest, a ‘nearly-impact’ after his introduction to the spanish front line. The final score Italy 1 Spain 1.
Claudio Marchisio, Antonio Cassano, Danielle De Rossi and Gianluigi Buffon all put forward their claim for Azzurri of the match. Iniesta continued to ‘wow’ plaudits for the Spanish, as others put in a nothing more than expected performance from the world champions.
Uefa named Marchisio (9.15) as their man of the match for both teams via their statistical method ahead of followers Fabregas, Iniesta, Xavi, Alonso and Busquets. The Juventus midfielder created balance in a robust midfield trio of Pirlo, himself and Thiago Motta. Marchisio showcased all aspects of his game and was unlucky not to score after unlocking the spanish control in the second half: dribbling through the open space from the half way line towards the spanish box to play a one-two, receive the ball back within the box only to hit a tame shot at Casillas. The Turin-born midfielder also recovered possession well throughout and made a key block to a goal bound Xavi effort.
Pirlo showed glimpses of mesmerising brilliance, including his assist, however was not consistent throughout the game with his passing – hopefully not a sign of tiredness after a long season with Juventus. While Danielle De Rossi had an excellent first half, the introduction of Torres showed a weakness in the player as a defender as Spain found Torres in a good position on more than one occasion:
“I did better in the first half and suffered more against Fernando Torres, who is physically strong and intelligent”
Danielle De Rossi: “It was natural to lose a little confidence after the Russia performance and some expected a catastrophe but that wasn’t the case”
Cesare Prandelli: “The important thing is that they did what I asked, playing well when passing vertically and gave our all. This is Italy.”
James Horncastle on Cesare Prandelli: “Nothing but admiration for Prandelli. Humble enough to put own system aside in recognition of what works here and now”
Post match the President of Italy, Napolitano went into in the locker room to congratulate many of the players on an optimistic outcome and embraced Buffon after his performance (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VGi0hiAyGy4).
The draw concluded a 14 match winning streak for the Spanish in competitive matches and leaves an air of optimism amongst the italians again after a recent pessimistic outlook on the Azzurri’s chances of winning Euro 2012. Both Italy and Spain showed glimpses of why they should be considered favourites for the tournament, upstaging any of the performances from early favourites in Group B.
While most of the Azzurri came out of the duel playing well, Mario Balotelli put in a below par performance in a promising Balo-Cassa striker force. The only positive to take from the game is that hopefully Balotelli will use that miss as fire for the rest of the tournament presuming Cesare Prandelli provides him with another opportunity in the next game, one that hopefully this time, he’ll take.
Using PDO to analyse how lucky a team may have been in the outcome of a game is a concept @11tegen11 and @jameswgrayson have employed in a bid to “separate the two entities that determine who wins a football match: luck and skill” (@11tegen11). The PDO concept was first used as analysis for Ice Hockey and has revolutionised the way in which teams are assessed.
The PDO is simply a number that determines how lucky each team has been. The PDO is set as a norm at 1000 and always combines with the opponents in a total of 2000 – is calculated as:
[Shooting Percentage (sh%) + Saving Percentage (sv%)] x 10 = PDO
Where sh% is calculated as ‘total number of goals’/’total number of shots’ x 100, and;
sv% is calculated as ‘total number of shots that missed’/‘total number of shots’ x 100
A PDO of 1001 would suggest that the team have been luckier than the norm of 1000 and a PDO of 999 would suggest a team have been unlucky compared to the norm. The combined value must always add up to 2000, since there are two teams each playing each with 1000 norm worth of luck-skill.
For example, take the Denmark v Netherlands game in Group B
Denmark: 1 goal, 8 shots. 32 ‘saves’ from 32 shots.
Netherlands: 0 goals, 32 shots, 7 ‘saves’ from 8.
Denmark PDO = 10 (12.5 + 100) = 1125
Netherlands PDO = 10 (0 + 87.5) = 875
Leaving Denmark with a PDO of 1125 and the Netherlands with a PDO of 875. Meaning that the Netherlands were 12.5% ‘unluckier’ (less efficient) than the norm, Denmark were 12.5% ‘luckier’ than the norm and a differential of 28.6% more luck to the Danes. Literally taken, Denmark won their game with a degree of luck and Netherlands lost by being unlucky.
Italy: 1 goal, 11 shots. 18 ‘saves’ from 19 shots
Spain: 1 goal, 19 shots. 10 ‘saves’ from 11 shots
Italy PDO = 10 (9+94.7) = 1038
Spain PDO = 10 (5.3+90.9) = 962
A minor differential of 76, or 38 more/less lucky for each side. Italy were 7.9% ‘luckier’ (more efficient) than the Spanish.
So to conclude were Italy lucky to draw against Spain? – In short, Yes… but only marginally, in relation to the Denmark and Netherlands game.
If Mario Balotelli had actually managed to get his shot away this would have evened this statistic up further still, providing Casillas had made the resultant save. This would have bought the totals to 972 and 1028 in the same balance of luck and a 5.7% luck differential.
SEE LINKS AND COMMENTS BELOW (click speech bubble top right) for a more comprehensive understanding behind the rationale and analysis of PDO on the Dutch Eredivisie and English Premier League using the same analysis method with additional outcomes such as futuristic prediction:
@11tegen11 http://11tegen11.net/?p=1731
@jameswgrayson http://jameswgrayson.wordpress.com
TikiTaka Football www.thepathismadebywalking.wordpress.com
All statistics taken from FourFourTwo Euro 2012 Stats Zone
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The ‘Tiki-Taka’ Handbook: Barcelona, Swansea, Spain
Moving away from the ‘long ball’ preaching
The ‘long ball’ tactic was first conceived in the 1950’s by theorist Charles Reep in England. Reep was a football enthusiast and analyst who studied in great lengths the number of passes that led to a goal and what positions the key passes took place.
The ‘long ball’ tactic was commended and celebrated by Charles Hughes who stood as head of coaching for the English FA during the 1990’s. Hughes saw success in Reep’s analysis and based much of his ideologies around Reep’s principles:
The result of these findings have laid the foundations to english football for generations and the offside rule changes did not alter the findings significantly. British football has since built teams around:
The product of this is the 4-4-2 system or any variation of this (4-2-4 etc) that requires wide wing play and balls being played over the midfield to the striker to knock the ball down to the midfield in a more advanced position on the field. This formation would eventually lead to the defensive minded players playing midfield to be exceptionally good at winning the ball back and playing a short pass into a player who could then start the route one style of football: the ‘Dunga/Makelele role’
The long ball system makes sense and requires a set of very particular players to fit the perfect mould for each role. The success in this system is perhaps far more successful over the course of history compared to the ‘total football’ of Holland’s 1980’s team or the fluent passing Brazil of 1970, Argentina of 2006 etc.
Football evolves over time. The requirements of a modern day football are in stark contrast with those of the 1950’s and 60’s. Players are now expected to run much further than before, the ball is now lighter and can be manipulated in ways it simply could not before.
Spain won the European Cup in 2008 and World Cup in 2010 without players that fit the ‘long ball’ mould. They won the tournaments playing ‘Tiki-Taka’ football, a type of football that has found its roots in Holland’s total football, but this time instead of a system that allowed players to interchange positions fluently it turned its focus to the fluency of possession and the very importance of it. This approach aimed to control both the ball and the opposition.
Brendan Rodgers of Swansea FC swears by ‘Tiki-Taka’ football and the recent all round appreciation for the way that Swansea play football has become of significant interest:
“I like to control games. I like to be responsible for our own destiny. If you are better than your opponent with the ball you have a 79 per cent chance of winning the game…for me it is quite logical. It doesn’t matter how big or small you are, if you don’t have the ball you can’t score.” (Rodgers 2012)
Rodgers states that the key to the success of his approach to the game is not to give fluency to players in such a way that the ‘total football’ does so that the Japanese U17’s more recently impressed with at the U17 World Cup (2011):
“My template for everything is organisation. With the ball you have to know the movement patterns, the rotation, the fluidity and positioning of the team. Then there’s our defensive organisation…so if it is not going well we have a default mechanism which makes us hard to beat and we can pass our way into the game again. Rest with the ball. Then we’ll build again.” (Rodgers 2012)
The ‘Tiki-Taka’ approach still does however require a whole new set of fundamentals to be in place in order to work. Players need to trust their team mates to do the right thing when they are on the ball and the success of the formation relies on every player to be doing their set of jobs in the correct way. The approach works on the principles that ‘the whole is greater that then sum of its parts’:
“The strength of us is the team. Leo Messi has made it very difficult for players who think they are good players. He’s a real team player. He is ultimately the best player in the world and may go on to become the best ever. But he’s also a team player…If you have someone like Messi doing it then I’m sure my friend Nathan Dyer can do it. It is an easy sell.” (Rodgers 2012)
The Tiki-Taka Approach
Brendan Rodgers recently sketched out his formation and explain his approach to the game for journalist Duncan White. First, he divides the pitch into eight zones and then plots out his formation. The division of zones is suggestive that each player when in possession should play a particular role, including the goal keeper and two centre backs:
“When we have the football everybody’s a player. The difference with us is that when we have the ball we play with 11 men, other teams play with 10 and a goalkeeper.” (Rodgers 2012)
The formation is nothing new, however, it’s the way in which each player is used within the formation that allows the approach to work. Therefore an adjustment must be made in the traditional view of this formation from a 4-5-1/ 4-3-3/ 3-4-3 to a 1-4-5-1, 1-4-3-3, 1-3-4-3 or even a 1-2-6-1. The point here is that the formation has lost its simplicity of which it can be viewed. The formation is now one not viewed as defence, midfield and attack but instead, over 7 zones of the pitch. Barcelona use a similar system: many noted their recent change in formation from a 4-3-3 to a 3-4-3 with the introduction of Cesc Fabregas, but the truth is they have not really changed formation as much as many have been led to believe.
The centre forward, creative inside wingers and attacking wing backs have been consistent features of many formations through out generations and their roles do not change with much significance. It is the role of zones 1, 2, 3 and 5 that act as the core to the build up play and the success in retaining possession over the entire duration of the game.
Leon Britton, Pirlo and Xavi are examples of players who act as the deep lying play makers, the water carriers, the short playing quarterback or the ‘volante de salida’ which simply translates in football terms as the outlet for under-pressure team mates.
“I get the ball, I pass, I get the ball, I pass, I get the ball, I pass.” (Xavier Hernandez 2011) Xavi’s hypnotic approach to the game in a simplified view. Key abilities are not to play the ball out of pressure but to play the ball within high pressure.
As mentioned before absolute belief that each player will do the right thing is vital. Therefore meaning players will not wait and watch their pass reach the opponents feet, but pass and look for space for yourself trusting not just your team mates but your own ability to pass and that it will reach the team mate you aimed for.
The ideal is that every player will have constant awareness of every other team mate’s positioning and offer yourself as a passing option whenever possible as many times as possible. As a general rule, players should look up around every 5-10 seconds to give themselves three options before they get the ball, this way the players are never caught out in possession. Expect the ball at any given moment. Ask many centre backs that played in the Bolton team of the early 2000’s and they will inform you that route one was top of the list of options before receiving the ball, this option will have been diminished considerably. Centre backs are also responsible for squeezing up the play to keep the team working together in each area of the field.
Barcelona play with a higher tempo without the ball, pressurising the opponents high up the field:
“You win the ball back when there are thirty metres to their goal not eighty” (Guardiola 2009)
Therefore, all players are expected to defend from the front and learn to keep men behind the ball as much as possible, this approach also allows the keeper to act as a sweeper when the opposition attempts to play high balls over the high back line. A contract in the older approach that defensive players do their duty and the attack wait to counter when their team mates win the ball back.
The alternative to high pressure, if the players you have struggle with fitness, is the complete opposite. To site back and tackle only in your own half and invite the opponents to try and play their way through you. Taking inspiration from Basketball’s approach of dropping back and protecting ‘the key’. This will encourage the opponents to either play long ball and give the ball back more often than not or encourage the opponents defence to become play makers, who again more often than not are not the best passers of the opposition and will lead to mistakes being made. It is important however, not to get carried away with the counter attacking approach after winning the ball back in deeper positions. Patience and the changes in tempo are key.
“I get the ball, I pass, I get the ball, I pass, I get the ball, I pass” (Xavier Hernandez 2011)
Applying to youth football teams
Total knowledge and understanding are a good place to start alongside the ability to keep the ball for youth football in the UK. Many children are playing in teams not quite understanding their roles in teams throughout the UK.
An important factor of successful creativity and development is not to punish mistakes, but reward successes. When one is punished for attempting to create, they will refrain from successfully creating in the future because they fear failure. Many coaches in youth football today are killing creativity and taking the good out of the naivety of the youth.
A handbook should be given to each player not only explaining the roles of their own position but the roles of all other positions to get the full concept of Tiki-Taka football.
“My template for everything is organisation. With the ball you have to know the movement patterns, the rotation, the fluidity and positioning of the team.” (Rodgers 2012)
Identifying your own youth players skills and potential is key in the selection of roles within the zones when in possession of the ball.
Practice will make perfect. Perfect football is achievable –
Maybe one day sunday league football will be enjoyable to play in for every position on the field. We might fail at first, but progress is made through failure.
Progress will be made.
The Path is Made By Walking 