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EURO 2012 FINAL PREVIEW “Spain are a well oiled machine” and “Italy are warm blooded”
Italy 1-1 Croatia Tactical Report & Why Croatia were 39.8% ‘Luckier’? [PDO v2]
Both the Azzurri and Croatia came into this game unchanged and in full confidence after their recent performances against Spain and the Republic of Ireland. Italy’s first half performance was comfortable – with the midfield trio of Pirlo, Marchisio and Thiago Motta running the show and the front line of Balotelli – Cassano were provided with constant ammunition.
It was Andrea Pirlo who broke the deadlock with a trademark placed free kick from 25 yards out. Incredibly, Pirlo became the first player to score directly from a free kick in the EURO’s since Czech Republic’s Marek Heinz scored against Germany in EURO 2004.
Slaven Bilic, who has agreed to manage Lokomotiv Moscow after the tournament, told Aleksander Holiga of The Guardian that he firmly believed his Croatia side have what it takes to win the tournament:
“Croatia can win it. When we take off, it’s an explosion”
And in the second half Croatia showed just why they are arguably one of the most complete sides tactically in the tournament. Both Strinic and Perisic (the left flank) had been pinned back by forward thinking wing back Christian Maggio in the first half which by and large contributed to Croatia’s lack of goal threat in the first half. This can be visually noticed by analysing the tackling zones, where Croatia were forced into their left back spot – making far more tackles in this zone compared to the second half.
Croatia heavily rely on their wing backs pushing on forward and aiding the wide midfielders to put crosses into the box: Srnic averaged 14 crosses per game in qualification (5 more than any other player during qualification) and ensemble, Croatia often put in over 30 crosses per game. However, Croatia only managed one successful cross in the first half (from a right sided corner) and only four in total from the left hand side. The half time interval brought about a change in emphasis from the right flank as an attacking outlet to the left.
While Strinic was an unused attacking outlet against the Republic of Ireland (only 2 attempted crosses out of the team’s 30), the half time team walk by Bilic clearly included a strategy to both prevent Maggio’s threat and to cross more from the left flank (Perisic and Strinic): Strinic attempted 10 crosses (37% of all Croatia’s crosses) against Italy. It was a stroke of genius from Bilic as it was Strinic’s cross from deep that produced the Mandzukic goal and leaving the Croatian fans bouncing behind the italian’s goal for the remainder of the game.
‘Croatia’. Why can’t the Azzurri beat Croatia? All four competitive matches against the croats since 1996 have ended in either defeat or a draw for the italians. Italy have now failed to win in six successive World and European Cup finals games, their longest non-winning streak at major tournaments.
Italy have now left themselves in a position of a must win game against Trappatoni’s Republic of Ireland – who themselves have been particularly poor against Spain and Croatia so far. However, in order to progress into the quarter finals not only do results need to go Italy’s way elsewhere, the Republic of Ireland are now in the dangerous position of playing without pressure and with an incredibly supportive 12th man behind them despite their failure to win a single game so far:
“How many times over the years have Ireland had big results against the odds? Think of USA 1994 when they beat Italy at Giants Stadium. I wouldn’t rule out something special happening this evening, because Ireland are capable of doing that.” (Kevin Kilbane, BBC Radio 5)
Why Croatia were 39.8% ‘luckier’ than Italy – PDO*
*using goal scoring opportunities only
As used briefly in my first match report for the Azzurri – PDO is aimed to “separate the two entities that determine who wins a football match: luck and skill” (@11tegen11) and is widely used in both basketball and ice hockey.
However, the first attempt at using PDO as an analysis tool in football for the Azzurri-Spain clash brought up a number of criticisms for its use in football. The PDO typically uses either shots on target or shots off target in its formula to attain the outcome:
[Shooting Percentage (sh%) + Saving Percentage (sv%)] x 10 = PDO (always a combined value of 2000)
While PDO works in Ice Hockey and Basketball and has revolutionised their analysis – there are considerable differences in these sports to football. Every shot taken is often a true opportunity as shooting is considered a linear outcome process. In football though, the amount of shots is complex and is not directly related to whether a team should win or not.
Using shots off target has its advantage as it tells more of a story, it reveals more about how much of attacking force one side were in comparison to another. However, more often than not a shot off target in one from a half chance and would not therefore determine how lucky a team were not to score.
There are also problems with using shots on target in this formula – football tactics are diverse, both attacking and defensive – just because one team has had more shots does not necessarily inform us of whether the quality of shots were ever going to truly have an opportunity of being a goal. Therefore instead of using either of these statistics in this adapted version of PDO, ‘real goal scoring opportunities’ are used in its replacement. By using goal scoring opportunities as the measure, you include all the true qualities of the chances of scoring and therefore winning (providing you score more than the opponent).
Luck in this case is defined in football terms as: a team who has less real goal scoring opportunities yet scores more goals. A ‘real goal scoring opportunity’ is a decision made at root decision – a chance that had the possibility of going in – therefore shots from tight angles that are straight at goal keepers are ignored, shots from distance that do not trouble the keeper or hit the corner flag per se are too ignored.
Goal scoring opportunities may include shots off target, shots on target or in a small number of circumstances no shot at all (Balotelli v Spain) – which was an OBVIOUS goal scoring opportunity, yet no shot was attempted. The key word here is OBVIOUS – the same terminology used in the rule book for sending a player off.
Italy PDO* 6 gso, 1 goal. 3 gso, 2 saves.
PDO* ITA = 10 (16.7 + 66.7) = 834*
Croatia PDO* 3 gso, 1 goal. 6 gso, 5 saves.
PDO*CRO = 10 (33.3 + 83.3) = 1166*
— Note all Goal Scoring Opportunities have been listed at the end of this article. —
Therefore from this analysis it can be derived that the Croatians were 39.8% ‘luckier’ (more efficient) than the Italians in winning their game. Croatia had 16.6% more luck than the norm (of 1000 PDO). Italy had 19.9% less luck than the norm.
Limitations to this analysis still lie within the tactical approaches of football. As noted throughout the match report, Croatia relied heavily on crossing the ball rather than feeding the ball through to their strikers. This will result in less opportunities actually being created as crossing rates are typically at best around 30% (see premier league winger statistics). However, this approach is a dangerous one and is consistent on a game basis for the main source of goals – see number of goals scored from headers at EURO 2012 – Jelavic and Mandzukic are also big targets and Croatia have by and large got their tactics spot on.
PDO*
the counted ‘real goal scoring opportunities’:
1 Italy – Balotelli, 2nd minute
2 Italy – Balotelli, 10th minute
3 Italy – Balotelli, 15th minute
4 Italy – Marchisio, 36th minute
5 Italy – Pirlo, 39th minute and GOAL
6 Italy – Montolivo, 76th minute
1 Croatia – Jelavic, 19th minute
2 Croatia – Modric, 46th minute
3 Croatia – Mario Mandzukic, 72nd minute and GOAL
For more information regarding PDO please visit the two links provided below:
@11tegen11 http://11tegen11.net/?p=1731
@jameswgrayson http://jameswgrayson.wordpress.com
Italy 1 Spain 1 | Tactics & statistically proving the answer to: were Italy lucky?
Note: see Italy’s EURO 2012 preview for context
The kings of two footballing philosophies locked horns in the opening Group C game of Euro 2012: Catenaccio and Tiki-Taka; Italy and Spain.
The Catenaccio philosophy is one associated with a highly organised and effective defensive tactic that focuses on taming the opponent’s attacks and in turn preventing any credible goal scoring opportunities. In Catenaccio, it is typical that the role of a sweeper, libero or verrouilleur is given a pivotal role in both defensive organisation and playing the ball out from the back – a commanding general.
In truth, the profession of a libero or verrouilleur is a dying role in modern-day football tactics – the likes of Franz Beckenbauer, Gaetano Scirea and Franco Baresi are now widely regarded as football antiquity. So eye brows should have been raised when Cesare Prandelli opted to move away from his preferred 4-3-1-2 to an italian suited 3-5-2, made using two wing backs and a libero(Danielle De Rossi), while instructing Juventus attacking midfielder Giaccherini to play out of position on his international début at left wing-back (a player who only four years a go was fighting relegation in Serie C2). Much of the prematch attention should have been directed towards Prandelli’s courage to employ such a tactic against the world champions.
Italy (3-5-2): Buffon, Maggio, Chiellini, Bonucci, Motta, Marchisio, Giaccherini, De Rossi, Pirlo, Balotelli, Cassano
Yet Vincente del Bosque had other ideas. La Furia Roja looked set to take the rule book of formations and simply tear it up, by announcing a team that seemingly was set up to play a 4-6-0 formation:
“When we got into the locker room we were joking around looking at the team sheet, as we couldn’t find a striker” reveals the Azzurri’s newly appointed Libero, Danielle De Rossi.
Guillem Balague (spanish football expert) argued that del Bosque had simply taken inspiration from an already widely praised and accepted Barcelona tactic:
“How many strikers do you think Barcelona use? No strikers means that there’s not one referent point, but five different mobile reference points…set formations are an obsolete way to look at football …centre backs prefer a number 9 due to familiarity of being able to mark them”
Balague went on to claim that del Bosque had set the team up like so, as a tactical response to both Italy’s likelihood of employing a Catenaccio strategy:
“Spain will find a team that will kill spaces. You combat that with dynamism, 2v1’s, short passing and involvement, hence no striker – [this is the] logical progression of style”
Spain looked to be playing to their own strengths, as a response to both their opponent’s set up, their own abilities and as a response to a lack of David Villa. With much of the attack built around a successful Barcelona team and the influence of the Barca-influenced infamous ‘rondo’ it seemed as if it was only a natural progression of formation in a bid to force what they do best: keep ball. The Rondo is essentially a fiercely competitive game of ‘piggy in the middle’ that has become tradition at Barca’s training ground and is often used to intimidate any new arrivals at the club.
However, it seems that there was actually less preparation for this tactic than one would expect, as Javi Matallanas revealed to Guillem Balague that Cesc Fabregas was only made aware of his role as a ‘false number 9’ three hours before kick off.
With a throw-back libero, a false number 9, a Balotelli-Cassano strike partnership, the battle of the regista’s (Xavi and Pirlo) and the clash of the two polar footballing philosophies this match up was beginning to look more and more like it was going to be one of the classics of Euro history.
Spain (4-6-0?): Casillas, Arbeloa, Piqué, Ramos, Alba; Busquets, Xabi Alonso, Xavi; Silva, Iniesta, Fàbregas
The 90 minutes
As expected the spanish dominated possession (65.8%) and played 646 passes to Italy’s 292 passes. Xavi, whom Gary Breen said would “keep the ball off you in a phone box”, was involved in 197 of Spain’s passes (played or received) and created 8 goal scoring opportunities for the striker-less tiki-taka side. Busquets was another player central to La Roja’s possession play as he was involved in 183 passes and boasted a 92% pass rate (the highest of anyone on the field).
Spain’s unnamed formation allowed the spanish to play 172 passes in the final third compared to Italy’s 48, a theme than ran throughout the game.
However, Italy pressed high, boasted a 100% tackling rate (15/15) and provided Spain with a problem as they didn’t begin the game with many players who could run in behind Italy’s back line. The libero role was played well by De Rossi who relieved Pirlo of the play-making pressure, with De Rossi deciding the direction of play more often than not.
It was noted that while Pirlo played the majority of his passes to the centralised players, De Rossi focused much of his passes down the flanks, into wider positions – this seemed to be an obvious tactical employment.
Half time came with the score at 0-0, but as one of the most technical and interesting duels of the competition so far.
The second half started, promising more of the same, only this time the first real opportunity came early in the half. A frustrated Mario Balotelli, pressing high up the field managed to steal the ball from Sergio Ramos and began the charge towards Casillas on his goal line. All of Spain and Italy held their breath as Balotelli’s charge towards the goal began to turn into a casual stroll towards Casillas as if a Playstation controller was running out of battery. As Balotelli began to see the world around him in slow motion Ramos had caught up with him to put in a last-ditch tackle. What just happened?!
Prandelli, clearly not happy with Balotelli’s performance and perhaps concerned about the booking Mario had received earlier on in the first half, decided to bring on Di Natale in his place, leaving Balotelli to think over how on earth he hadn’t had a shot moments before.
Up stepped Andrea Pirlo to stake his claim as one of the world’s best – skipping past his Spanish marker on the half way line and changing the pace of the game to feed through Di Natale, who put away his first shot of the game and made his mark immediately.
But the action packed opening to the second half was not finished just yet. Three minutes later Spain managed to get in behind De Rossi with a clever run from Cesc Fabregas who finished cooly – to complete the curse commentator Jon Champion had put on the game where he opened the game with the words “there is no striker, there’s only Fabregas” much like Tim Lovejoy’s cursed words of “Don’t worry, it’s only Ray Parlour”, moments before the midfielder hit an unstoppable shot from 30 yards in the 2002 FA Cup final win against Chelsea.
Di Natale had one more undeniable opportunity with an agonisingly missed volley inside the box from a clever Giovinco ball before the game returned to it’s status quo of Spanish control in the final third, in a duel that looked destined for a testing draw there after – aside from the two missed Torres one on one opportunities to put the game to rest, a ‘nearly-impact’ after his introduction to the spanish front line. The final score Italy 1 Spain 1.
Azzurri Key Performances
Claudio Marchisio, Antonio Cassano, Danielle De Rossi and Gianluigi Buffon all put forward their claim for Azzurri of the match. Iniesta continued to ‘wow’ plaudits for the Spanish, as others put in a nothing more than expected performance from the world champions.
Uefa named Marchisio (9.15) as their man of the match for both teams via their statistical method ahead of followers Fabregas, Iniesta, Xavi, Alonso and Busquets. The Juventus midfielder created balance in a robust midfield trio of Pirlo, himself and Thiago Motta. Marchisio showcased all aspects of his game and was unlucky not to score after unlocking the spanish control in the second half: dribbling through the open space from the half way line towards the spanish box to play a one-two, receive the ball back within the box only to hit a tame shot at Casillas. The Turin-born midfielder also recovered possession well throughout and made a key block to a goal bound Xavi effort.
Pirlo showed glimpses of mesmerising brilliance, including his assist, however was not consistent throughout the game with his passing – hopefully not a sign of tiredness after a long season with Juventus. While Danielle De Rossi had an excellent first half, the introduction of Torres showed a weakness in the player as a defender as Spain found Torres in a good position on more than one occasion:
“I did better in the first half and suffered more against Fernando Torres, who is physically strong and intelligent”
Azzurri Post Match Quotes
Danielle De Rossi: “It was natural to lose a little confidence after the Russia performance and some expected a catastrophe but that wasn’t the case”
Cesare Prandelli: “The important thing is that they did what I asked, playing well when passing vertically and gave our all. This is Italy.”
James Horncastle on Cesare Prandelli: “Nothing but admiration for Prandelli. Humble enough to put own system aside in recognition of what works here and now”
Post match the President of Italy, Napolitano went into in the locker room to congratulate many of the players on an optimistic outcome and embraced Buffon after his performance (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VGi0hiAyGy4).
The draw concluded a 14 match winning streak for the Spanish in competitive matches and leaves an air of optimism amongst the italians again after a recent pessimistic outlook on the Azzurri’s chances of winning Euro 2012. Both Italy and Spain showed glimpses of why they should be considered favourites for the tournament, upstaging any of the performances from early favourites in Group B.
While most of the Azzurri came out of the duel playing well, Mario Balotelli put in a below par performance in a promising Balo-Cassa striker force. The only positive to take from the game is that hopefully Balotelli will use that miss as fire for the rest of the tournament presuming Cesare Prandelli provides him with another opportunity in the next game, one that hopefully this time, he’ll take.
Were they lucky? Introduction: Analysis of PDO
Using PDO to analyse how lucky a team may have been in the outcome of a game is a concept @11tegen11 and @jameswgrayson have employed in a bid to “separate the two entities that determine who wins a football match: luck and skill” (@11tegen11). The PDO concept was first used as analysis for Ice Hockey and has revolutionised the way in which teams are assessed.
The PDO is simply a number that determines how lucky each team has been. The PDO is set as a norm at 1000 and always combines with the opponents in a total of 2000 – is calculated as:
[Shooting Percentage (sh%) + Saving Percentage (sv%)] x 10 = PDO
Where sh% is calculated as ‘total number of goals’/’total number of shots’ x 100, and;
sv% is calculated as ‘total number of shots that missed’/‘total number of shots’ x 100
A PDO of 1001 would suggest that the team have been luckier than the norm of 1000 and a PDO of 999 would suggest a team have been unlucky compared to the norm. The combined value must always add up to 2000, since there are two teams each playing each with 1000 norm worth of luck-skill.
For example, take the Denmark v Netherlands game in Group B
Denmark: 1 goal, 8 shots. 32 ‘saves’ from 32 shots.
Netherlands: 0 goals, 32 shots, 7 ‘saves’ from 8.
Denmark PDO = 10 (12.5 + 100) = 1125
Netherlands PDO = 10 (0 + 87.5) = 875
Leaving Denmark with a PDO of 1125 and the Netherlands with a PDO of 875. Meaning that the Netherlands were 12.5% ‘unluckier’ (less efficient) than the norm, Denmark were 12.5% ‘luckier’ than the norm and a differential of 28.6% more luck to the Danes. Literally taken, Denmark won their game with a degree of luck and Netherlands lost by being unlucky.
Were they lucky? Conclusion: Italy and Spain PDO
Italy: 1 goal, 11 shots. 18 ‘saves’ from 19 shots
Spain: 1 goal, 19 shots. 10 ‘saves’ from 11 shots
Italy PDO = 10 (9+94.7) = 1038
Spain PDO = 10 (5.3+90.9) = 962
A minor differential of 76, or 38 more/less lucky for each side. Italy were 7.9% ‘luckier’ (more efficient) than the Spanish.
So to conclude were Italy lucky to draw against Spain? – In short, Yes… but only marginally, in relation to the Denmark and Netherlands game.
If Mario Balotelli had actually managed to get his shot away this would have evened this statistic up further still, providing Casillas had made the resultant save. This would have bought the totals to 972 and 1028 in the same balance of luck and a 5.7% luck differential.
SEE LINKS AND COMMENTS BELOW (click speech bubble top right) for a more comprehensive understanding behind the rationale and analysis of PDO on the Dutch Eredivisie and English Premier League using the same analysis method with additional outcomes such as futuristic prediction:
@11tegen11 http://11tegen11.net/?p=1731
@jameswgrayson http://jameswgrayson.wordpress.com
TikiTaka Football www.thepathismadebywalking.wordpress.com
All statistics taken from FourFourTwo Euro 2012 Stats Zone
The Path is Made By Walking 