was-andy-carroll-leaving-on-loan-really-a-mistake

After the Arsenal game Brendan Rodgers came out with one of the most surprising post match quotes that I’ve heard for some time as he admitted that Carroll would not have left if he had known there would be no replacement.

 

We live in an age where admitting liability is like handing someone a baseball bat and painting your scrotum so that it resembles a pinata. Whether it’s a personal injury claim after you cover the floor in slippery bananas and forget to put up the “careful, banana’d floor” sign. Whether you cause a pile up on the A1 after making an emergency stop to take a really cool Instagram picture of the Angel of the North. Or whether you’re a young manager, recently appointed head honcho of a club with the Premier Leagues most clinically insane following and you give away a striker who cost the club £35 million just a season ago. Generally it’s best to go with “It’s a shame this happened to you” and make a hasty retreat, obscuring your face and/or number plates.

 

The admission of liability came as a surprise to me as I couldn’t understand the logic behind his claim. If it was so crucial to Brendan Rodgers that he had another option in attack then why not do either of the following?

 

Option 1: Agree the loan in principle, with the deal only completed after your expected signing is signed.

 

Option 2: Have a clause that allows Carroll to be recalled at any time.

 

As it stands he did neither. Carroll was allowed to leave before a bid for Dempsey had even been made, and seeing as Fulham and Liverpool are hardly “best buds” at the moment it’s slightly hopeful to assume they would simply bid Clint farewell and book him a taxi/helicopter/hovercraft to Liverpool. Yes, Carroll has a clause which allows him to be recalled in January. But then if a backup striker is so important that an injury on the 1st of February or the 1st of September leaves you without a striker for half a season this seems a pretty poor option.

 

It was only when Gabriele Marcotti suggested that it may have been a political ploy by Rodgers that it started to make sense.

 

By bidding Carroll farewell and then bemoaning his loss Rodgers effectively shrugs off any responsibility for a difficult first season. If Liverpool “underachieve” and finish in 8th place: “well, not having Andy Carroll really left us short. It was a silly mistake we won’t be making again”. If Carroll goes to West Ham and flops, or if Liverpool end up doing quite well, Rodgers has saved them a years wages which can then be spent on a better player. If Carroll goes to West Ham, flourishes and then returns ,or is sold, then he either “needed game time” or “couldn’t handle the pressure”. In any scenario Rodgers comes out smelling like a lovely Welsh rose.

 

I’d imagine the response at this point will be that of “that’s ridiculous, we only have two strikers now!”. But similar situations exist at Tottenham and Arsenal without the same level of panic.

 

If you look at the pure strikers (excluding midfielder’s playing as strikers) then at Tottenham you have Adebayor and Defoe.

 

At Arsenal you have; Giroud, Podolski and Chamakh. With Podolski much more suited to being played on the wing than in the middle, and Chamakh with one goal in his last 1000 minutes of football (more than twice as bad as Carroll). They have also loaned out those who would likely be the last resort options in; Bendtner, Afobe and Park Chu Young.

 

If Liverpool suffer one injury to a striker then they could easily revert to a one striker formation like that favoured by Rodgers at Swansea. Two injuries and they could use their new signing Yesil who, while raw, is a promising young striker. In the unlikely scenario of three injuries they would be in the same position as the other teams, resorting to deploying an attacking midfielder as a striker.

 

Now admittedly the midfield as a striker options available to Spurs and Arsenal are probably better than the options available to Liverpool. At Spurs you have Dembele and Dempsey who could probably slot into CF quite easily. Less so at Arsenal. I’d be less than confident in handing Gervinho or Walcott the CF position and Chamakh looks like a man who has solemnly pledged to abstain from the natural sin of slotting one in the net.

 

My point being that, while slightly better scenarios, there seems to be almost no concern from either Spurs or Arsenal. Whereas Liverpool are treating their lack of strikers as if it has the potential to derail the season. Rarely has such concern been raised over the loss of a striker who averages a goal every 420 minutes, or approximately a goal every 5 games.

 

A cunning ploy or a foolish oversight? The motive seems to be in the eye of the beholder.

EXCLUSIVE: The Tiki Taka Handbook book cover

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Reminder: SIGN UP to the official website http://www.thepathismadebywalking.com ‘s newsletter to receive notification of release date and all other information when it becomes available. Many thanks, Jed

EXCLUSIVE: The Tiki Taka Handbook book cover

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EURO 2012 FINAL PREVIEW “Spain are a well oiled machine” and “Italy are warm blooded”

CONTENT MOVED TO:

http://www.thepathismadebywalking.com/002%20Journal/euro2012-final-preview-italy.html

What would an Andre Villas-Boas Tottenham Hotspur look like?

CONTENT MOVED TO:

http://www.thepathismadebywalking.com/002%20Journal/avb-spurs.html

The World’s Greatest Ever: Classic XI

CONTENT MOVED TO:

http://www.thepathismadebywalking.com/002%20Journal/GREATEST-XI.html

Italy 1-1 Croatia Tactical Report & Why Croatia were 39.8% ‘Luckier’? [PDO v2]

Both the Azzurri and Croatia came into this game unchanged and in full confidence after their recent performances against Spain and the Republic of Ireland. Italy’s first half performance was comfortable – with the midfield trio of Pirlo, Marchisio and Thiago Motta running the show and the front line of Balotelli – Cassano were provided with constant ammunition.

It was Andrea Pirlo who broke the deadlock with a trademark placed free kick from 25 yards out. Incredibly, Pirlo became the first player to score directly from a free kick in the EURO’s since Czech Republic’s Marek Heinz scored against Germany in EURO 2004.

Slaven Bilic, who has agreed to manage Lokomotiv Moscow after the tournament, told Aleksander Holiga of The Guardian that he firmly believed his Croatia side have what it takes to win the tournament:

“Croatia can win it. When we take off, it’s an explosion”

And in the second half Croatia showed just why they are arguably one of the most complete sides tactically in the tournament. Both Strinic and Perisic (the left flank) had been pinned back  by forward thinking wing back Christian Maggio in the first half which by and large contributed to Croatia’s lack of goal threat in the first half. This can be visually noticed by analysing the tackling zones, where Croatia were forced into their left back spot – making far more tackles in this zone compared to the second half.

Croatia heavily rely on their wing backs pushing on forward and aiding the wide midfielders to put crosses into the box: Srnic averaged 14 crosses per game in qualification (5 more than any other player during qualification) and ensemble, Croatia often put in over 30 crosses per game. However, Croatia only managed one successful cross in the first half (from a right sided corner) and only four in total from the left hand side. The half time interval brought about a change in emphasis from the right flank as an attacking outlet to the left.

While Strinic was an unused attacking outlet against the Republic of Ireland (only 2 attempted crosses out of the team’s 30), the half time team walk by Bilic clearly included a strategy to both prevent Maggio’s threat and to cross more from the left flank (Perisic and Strinic): Strinic attempted 10 crosses (37% of all Croatia’s crosses) against Italy. It was a stroke of genius from Bilic as it was Strinic’s cross from deep that produced the Mandzukic goal and leaving the Croatian fans bouncing behind the italian’s goal for the remainder of the game.

‘Croatia’. Why can’t the Azzurri beat Croatia? All four competitive matches against the croats since 1996 have ended in either defeat or a draw for the italians. Italy have now failed to win in six successive World and European Cup finals games, their longest non-winning streak at major tournaments.

Italy have now left themselves in a position of a must win game against Trappatoni’s Republic of Ireland – who themselves have been particularly poor against Spain and Croatia so far. However, in order to progress into the quarter finals not only do results need to go Italy’s way elsewhere, the Republic of Ireland are now in the dangerous position of playing without pressure and with an incredibly supportive 12th man behind them despite their failure to win a single game so far:

“How many times over the years have Ireland had big results against the odds? Think of USA 1994 when they beat Italy at Giants Stadium. I wouldn’t rule out something special happening this evening, because Ireland are capable of doing that.” (Kevin Kilbane, BBC Radio 5)

Why Croatia were 39.8% ‘luckier’ than Italy – PDO*

*using goal scoring opportunities only

As used briefly in my first match report for the Azzurri – PDO is aimed to “separate the two entities that determine who wins a football match: luck and skill” (@11tegen11) and is widely used in both basketball and ice hockey.

However, the first attempt at using PDO as an analysis tool in football for the Azzurri-Spain clash brought up a number of criticisms for its use in football. The PDO typically uses either shots on target or shots off target in its formula to attain the outcome:

[Shooting Percentage (sh%) + Saving Percentage (sv%)] x 10 = PDO (always a combined value of 2000)

While PDO works in Ice Hockey and Basketball and has revolutionised their analysis – there are considerable differences in these sports to football. Every shot taken is often a true opportunity as shooting is considered a linear outcome process. In football though, the amount of shots is complex and is not directly related to whether a team should win or not.

Using shots off target has its advantage as it tells more of a story, it reveals more about how much of attacking force one side were in comparison to another. However, more often than not a shot off target in one from a half chance and would not therefore determine how lucky a team were not to score.

There are also problems with using shots on target in this formula – football tactics are diverse, both attacking and defensive – just because one team has had more shots does not necessarily inform us of whether the quality of shots were ever going to truly have an opportunity of being a goal. Therefore instead of using either of these statistics in this adapted version of PDO, ‘real goal scoring opportunities’ are used in its replacement. By using goal scoring opportunities as the measure, you include all the true qualities of the chances of scoring and therefore winning (providing you score more than the opponent).

Luck in this case is defined in football terms as: a team who has less real goal scoring opportunities yet scores more goals. A ‘real goal scoring opportunity’ is a decision made at root decision – a chance that had the possibility of going in – therefore shots from tight angles that are straight at goal keepers are ignored, shots from distance that do not trouble the keeper or hit the corner flag per se are too ignored.

Goal scoring opportunities may include shots off target, shots on target or in a small number of circumstances no shot at all (Balotelli v Spain) – which was an OBVIOUS goal scoring opportunity, yet no shot was attempted. The key word here is OBVIOUS – the same terminology used in the rule book for sending a player off.

Italy PDO* 6 gso, 1 goal. 3 gso, 2 saves.

PDO* ITA = 10 (16.7 + 66.7) = 834* 

Croatia PDO* 3 gso, 1 goal. 6 gso, 5 saves.

PDO*CRO = 10 (33.3 + 83.3) = 1166*

— Note all Goal Scoring Opportunities have been listed at the end of this article. 

Therefore from this analysis it can be derived that the Croatians were 39.8% ‘luckier’ (more efficient) than the Italians in winning their game.  Croatia had 16.6% more luck than the norm (of 1000 PDO). Italy had 19.9% less luck than the norm. 

Limitations to this analysis still lie within the tactical approaches of football. As noted throughout the match report, Croatia relied heavily on crossing the ball rather than feeding the ball through to their strikers. This will result in less opportunities actually being created as crossing rates are typically at best around 30% (see premier league winger statistics). However, this approach is a dangerous one and is consistent on a game basis for the main source of goals – see number of goals scored from headers at EURO 2012 – Jelavic and Mandzukic are also big targets and Croatia have by and large got their tactics spot on.

                                                                                         

PDO*

the counted ‘real goal scoring opportunities’:

1 Italy – Balotelli, 2nd minute

2 Italy – Balotelli, 10th minute

3 Italy – Balotelli, 15th minute

4 Italy – Marchisio, 36th minute

5 Italy – Pirlo, 39th minute and GOAL

6 Italy – Montolivo, 76th minute

1 Croatia – Jelavic, 19th minute

2 Croatia – Modric, 46th minute

3 Croatia – Mario Mandzukic, 72nd minute and GOAL

                                                                                         
For more information regarding PDO please visit the two links provided below:

Match Report: Santos 0 x 1 Corinthians, Copa Libertadores Semi Final 1st Leg

In a game where a red card, police man’s helmet and a stadium blackout (whilst the away team were on the attack) all happening within the the closing moments of the fiery match – TPiMBW felt a write up was more than appropriate, despite a lacklustre performance from the Neymar-Elano-Ganso axis

The atmosphere at the Vila Belmiro stadium in the game between the two São Paulo giants was nothing short of any you’d expect to find in a Manchester derby; the game itself was just as fiery and fast paced from the first minute to the last.

Corinthians’ manager Tite set his team out in a traditional 4-2-3-1, a formation that many teams use throughout Europe and the underdogs started the game comfortably, proving that Tite’s tactical approach might just be the antidote to Santos’ creativity and flair going forward. The visitors set the fiery tempo early on with former Qatar international (but  Brazilian born) forward Emerson Sheik looking dangerous every time the ball came to him in the attacking channels.

With less than 30 minutes showing on the clock, Corinthians midfielder Paulinho dribbled forward with the ball inviting both Henrique and Edu Dracena out of position, to leave Emerson Sheik with what seemed like acres of space in an unmarked position on the far corner of the box, and from there effortlessly and audaciously curled the ball into the far corner to put the visitors ahead and send the travelling fans into ecstasy – it was at this point I realised just how much of an important game this was, more than just the South American ‘Champions League’ Semi Finals.

Santos came out in the second half determined to prove a point after a tame first half – Neymar in particular put on a performance that made him look no better than Crystal Palace’s Wilfried Zaha (who, albeit a good player but nowhere near Messi and Ronaldo).

The home team came out as more of a threat in the second half after the introduction of striker Borges presented Corinthians with much to think about, however an excellent performance from ex-PSV goalkeeper Cassio denied the possibility of any cross or shot causing damange – as he spent much of the game flying forward from his goal line beating the ball away, in a performance that leaves you wandering how on earth he hadn’t made an impression in the Dutch Eredivisie for PSV.

As Santos pushed closer and closer to an equaliser Corinthians made a quick counter attack leaving Emerson in a one on one chase to Rafael’s goal line. Emerson however, rather foolishly decided to dive as he felt a Santos defender behind him and claim for a penalty, while in a perfect position to pull his shot away and test Rafael on his goal line. The referee however, waved away the flurry of appeals and play went on.

Now, in a series of moments that can only be described as ‘utter madness’ the game’s stranger events unfolded. It all began with Neymar putting in a poor challenge and receiving a yellow card in the Santos attacking third, before Emerson Sheik appeared to dive in on Neymar recklessly (and possibly in revenge) in the following phase of play inside the Santos defensive third – as a result Emerson Sheik left the field of play to a Adriano Bispo shove and a red card.

Moments later while Cassio was set to take a goal kick, a police man’s helmet was thrown from the fiery crowd in his direction – how on earth a fan had managed to wrestle a policeman for his helmet, nobody knows!

With just ten minutes remaining in the first leg, Santos came agonisingly close to snatching a late draw with Alan Kardec playing a teasing ball low and hard ball across the six yard box, leaving Neymar inches away from making contact, stretching at the far post.

Corinthians were doing a good job of counter attacking the desperation of the Santos attack and once again went on the attack – only this time for the stadium to plummet into complete darkness as the stadium’s electricity went off! Play was suspended for twelve minutes and during this time the fans made their voices heard, passionately filling the stadium with the traditional club songs, a moment that no television can fully portray.

When play finally resumed, the Peixe looked the more dangerous of the two and continued to press forward but again Cassio and his defence held up well, preventing any real opportunities for Santos to equalise. The game finished Santos 0 Corinthians 1.

The second leg awaits Santos and Neymar to up their game next Wednesday, fighting Corinthian’s away goal advantage.

TPiMBW’s Man of the Match: Adriano Bispo

Adriano was one of the few Santos players who could come out of the game with their head held high – Ganso can be excused due to only very recently returning from injury.

The defensive midfielder put in a Makelele like expert performance – excellent positioning, cover and progressive but often simple use of the ball. The fast and effective defensive midfielder is relatively new to the Santos set up, having only broken into the first team in the previous season. However, Adriano’s stock has risen considerably since 2011.

The Makelele type player showed all the signs that he could one day perform in any of the European leagues and do so well. His speed, marking ability, tackling ability, general reading of the game and comprehensive effectiveness are all attributes hard to come by in Brazilian football – Adriano is so often left the unsung hero in a successful Santos side. At this rate, Adriano will no doubt become one of the club’s top earners in the near future and if not, who knows where he’ll be playing his football – on this performance alone, he is good enough for anyone.

Italy 1 Spain 1 | Tactics & statistically proving the answer to: were Italy lucky?

Note: see Italy’s EURO 2012 preview for context

The kings of two footballing philosophies locked horns in the opening Group C game of Euro 2012: Catenaccio and Tiki-Taka; Italy and Spain.

The Catenaccio philosophy is one associated with a highly organised and effective defensive tactic that focuses on taming the opponent’s attacks and in turn preventing any credible goal scoring opportunities. In Catenaccio, it is typical that the role of a sweeper, libero or verrouilleur is given a pivotal role in both defensive organisation and playing the ball out from the back – a commanding general.

In truth, the profession of a libero or verrouilleur is a dying role in modern-day football tactics – the likes of Franz Beckenbauer, Gaetano Scirea and Franco Baresi are now widely regarded as football antiquity. So eye brows should have been raised when Cesare Prandelli opted to move away from his preferred 4-3-1-2 to an italian suited 3-5-2, made using two wing backs and a libero(Danielle De Rossi), while instructing Juventus attacking midfielder Giaccherini to play out of position on his international début at left wing-back (a player who only four years a go was fighting relegation in Serie C2). Much of the prematch attention should have been directed towards Prandelli’s courage to employ such a tactic against the world champions.

Italy (3-5-2): Buffon, Maggio, Chiellini, Bonucci, Motta, Marchisio, Giaccherini, De Rossi, Pirlo, Balotelli, Cassano

Yet Vincente del Bosque had other ideas. La Furia Roja looked set to take the rule book of formations and simply tear it up, by announcing a team that seemingly was set up to play a 4-6-0 formation:

When we got into the locker room we were joking around looking at the team sheet, as we couldn’t find a striker” reveals the Azzurri’s newly appointed Libero, Danielle De Rossi.

Guillem Balague (spanish football expert) argued that del Bosque had simply taken inspiration from an already widely praised and accepted Barcelona tactic:

“How many strikers do you think Barcelona use? No strikers means that there’s not one referent point, but five different mobile reference points…set formations are an obsolete way to look at football …centre backs prefer a number 9 due to familiarity of being able to mark them”

Balague went on to claim that del Bosque had set the team up like so, as a tactical response to both Italy’s likelihood of employing a Catenaccio strategy:

“Spain will find a team that will kill spaces. You combat that with dynamism, 2v1’s, short passing and involvement, hence no striker – [this is the] logical progression of style”

Spain looked to be playing to their own strengths, as a response to both their opponent’s set up, their own abilities and as a response to a lack of David Villa. With much of the attack built around a successful Barcelona team and the influence of the Barca-influenced infamous ‘rondo’ it seemed as if it was only a natural progression of formation in a bid to force what they do best: keep ball. The Rondo is essentially a fiercely competitive game of ‘piggy in the middle’ that has become tradition at Barca’s training ground and is often used to intimidate any new arrivals at the club.

However, it seems that there was actually less preparation for this tactic than one would expect, as Javi Matallanas revealed to Guillem Balague that Cesc Fabregas was only made aware of his role as a ‘false number 9’ three hours before kick off.

With a throw-back libero, a false number 9, a Balotelli-Cassano strike partnership, the battle of the regista’s (Xavi and Pirlo) and the clash of the two polar footballing philosophies this match up was beginning to look more and more like it was going to be one of the classics of Euro history.

Spain (4-6-0?): Casillas, Arbeloa, Piqué, Ramos, Alba; Busquets, Xabi Alonso, Xavi; Silva, Iniesta, Fàbregas

The 90 minutes

As expected the spanish dominated possession (65.8%) and played 646 passes to Italy’s 292 passes. Xavi, whom Gary Breen said would “keep the ball off you in a phone box”, was involved in 197 of Spain’s passes (played or received) and created 8 goal scoring opportunities for the striker-less tiki-taka side. Busquets was another player central to La Roja’s possession play as he was involved in 183 passes and boasted a 92% pass rate (the highest of anyone on the field).

Spain’s unnamed formation allowed the spanish to play 172 passes in the final third compared to Italy’s 48, a theme than ran throughout the game.

Screen Shot 2012 06 11 at 02.33.05 Italy 1 Spain 1 | Review & Statistically Proving   Were Italy Lucky?

However, Italy pressed high, boasted a 100% tackling rate (15/15) and provided Spain with a problem as they didn’t begin the game with many players who could run in behind Italy’s back line. The libero role was played well by De Rossi who relieved Pirlo of the play-making pressure, with De Rossi deciding the direction of play more often than not.

Screen Shot 2012 06 11 at 02.37.52 Italy 1 Spain 1 | Review & Statistically Proving   Were Italy Lucky?

It was noted that while Pirlo played the majority of his passes to the centralised players, De Rossi focused much of his passes down the flanks, into wider positions – this seemed to be an obvious tactical employment.

Half time came with the score at 0-0, but as one of the most technical and interesting duels of the competition so far.

The second half started, promising more of the same, only this time the first real opportunity came early in the half. A frustrated Mario Balotelli, pressing high up the field managed to steal the ball from Sergio Ramos and began the charge towards Casillas on his goal line. All of Spain and Italy held their breath as Balotelli’s charge towards the goal began to turn into a casual stroll towards Casillas as if a Playstation controller was running out of battery. As Balotelli began to see the world around him in slow motion Ramos had caught up with him to put in a last-ditch tackle. What just happened?!

Prandelli, clearly not happy with Balotelli’s performance and perhaps concerned about the booking Mario had received earlier on in the first half, decided to bring on Di Natale in his place, leaving Balotelli to think over how on earth he hadn’t had a shot moments before.

Up stepped Andrea Pirlo to stake his claim as one of the world’s best – skipping past his Spanish marker on the half way line and changing the pace of the game to feed through Di Natale, who put away his first shot of the game and made his mark immediately.

But the action packed opening to the second half was not finished just yet. Three minutes later Spain managed to get in behind De Rossi with a clever run from Cesc Fabregas who finished cooly – to complete the curse commentator Jon Champion had put on the game where he opened the game with the words “there is no striker, there’s only Fabregas” much like Tim Lovejoy’s cursed words of “Don’t worry, it’s only Ray Parlour”, moments before the midfielder hit an unstoppable shot from 30 yards in the 2002 FA Cup final win against Chelsea.

Di Natale had one more undeniable opportunity with an agonisingly missed volley inside the box from a clever Giovinco ball before the game returned to it’s status quo of Spanish control in the final third, in a duel that looked destined for a testing draw there after – aside from the two missed Torres one on one opportunities to put the game to rest, a ‘nearly-impact’ after his introduction to the spanish front line. The final score Italy 1 Spain 1.

Azzurri Key Performances

Claudio Marchisio, Antonio Cassano, Danielle De Rossi and Gianluigi Buffon all put forward their claim for Azzurri of the match. Iniesta continued to ‘wow’ plaudits for the Spanish, as others put in a nothing more than expected performance from the world champions.

Uefa named Marchisio (9.15) as their man of the match for both teams via their statistical method ahead of followers Fabregas, Iniesta, Xavi, Alonso and Busquets. The Juventus midfielder created balance in a robust midfield trio of Pirlo, himself and Thiago Motta. Marchisio showcased all aspects of his game and was unlucky not to score after unlocking the spanish control in the second half: dribbling through the open space from the half way line towards the spanish box to play a one-two, receive the ball back within the box only to hit a tame shot at Casillas. The Turin-born midfielder also recovered possession well throughout and made a key block to a goal bound Xavi effort.

Pirlo showed glimpses of mesmerising brilliance, including his assist, however was not consistent throughout the game with his passing – hopefully not a sign of tiredness after a long season with Juventus. While Danielle De Rossi had an excellent first half, the introduction of Torres showed a weakness in the player as a defender as Spain found Torres in a good position on more than one occasion:

“I did better in the first half and suffered more against Fernando Torres, who is physically strong and intelligent”

Azzurri Post Match Quotes

Danielle De Rossi: “It was natural to lose a little confidence after the Russia performance and some expected a catastrophe but that wasn’t the case”

Cesare Prandelli: “The important thing is that they did what I asked, playing well when passing vertically and gave our all. This is Italy.”

James Horncastle on Cesare Prandelli: “Nothing but admiration for Prandelli. Humble enough to put own system aside in recognition of what works here and now”

Post match the President of Italy, Napolitano went into in the locker room to congratulate many of the players on an optimistic outcome and embraced Buffon after his performance (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VGi0hiAyGy4).

The draw concluded a 14 match winning streak for the Spanish in competitive matches and leaves an air of optimism amongst the italians again after a recent pessimistic outlook on the Azzurri’s chances of winning Euro 2012. Both Italy and Spain showed glimpses of why they should be considered favourites for the tournament, upstaging any of the performances from early favourites in Group B.

While most of the Azzurri came out of the duel playing well, Mario Balotelli put in a below par performance in a promising Balo-Cassa striker force. The only positive to take from the game is that hopefully Balotelli will use that miss as fire for the rest of the tournament presuming Cesare Prandelli provides him with another opportunity in the next game, one that hopefully this time, he’ll take.

Were they lucky? Introduction: Analysis of PDO 

Using PDO to analyse how lucky a team may have been in the outcome of a game is a concept @11tegen11 and  @jameswgrayson have employed in a bid to separate the two entities that determine who wins a football match: luck and skill” (@11tegen11). The PDO concept was first used as analysis for Ice Hockey and has revolutionised the way in which teams are assessed.

The PDO is simply a number that determines how lucky each team has been. The PDO is set as a norm at 1000 and always combines with the opponents in a total of 2000 – is calculated as:

[Shooting Percentage (sh%) + Saving Percentage (sv%)] x 10 = PDO

Where sh% is calculated as ‘total number of goals’/’total number of shots’ x 100, and;

sv% is calculated as ‘total number of shots that missed’/‘total number of shots’ x 100

A PDO of 1001 would suggest that the team have been luckier than the norm of 1000 and a PDO of 999 would suggest a team have been unlucky compared to the norm. The combined value must always add up to 2000, since there are two teams each playing each with 1000 norm worth of luck-skill.

For example, take the Denmark v Netherlands game in Group B

Denmark: 1 goal, 8 shots. 32 ‘saves’ from 32 shots.

Netherlands: 0 goals, 32 shots, 7 ‘saves’ from 8.

Denmark PDO = 10 (12.5 + 100) = 1125

Netherlands PDO = 10 (0 + 87.5) = 875

Leaving Denmark with a PDO of 1125 and the Netherlands with a PDO of 875. Meaning that the Netherlands were 12.5% ‘unluckier’ (less efficient) than the norm, Denmark were 12.5% ‘luckier’ than the norm and a differential of 28.6% more luck to the Danes. Literally taken, Denmark won their game with a degree of luck and Netherlands lost by being unlucky.

Were they lucky? Conclusion: Italy and Spain PDO

Italy: 1 goal, 11 shots. 18 ‘saves’ from 19 shots

Spain: 1 goal, 19 shots. 10 ‘saves’ from 11 shots

Italy PDO = 10 (9+94.7) = 1038

Spain PDO = 10 (5.3+90.9) = 962

A minor differential of 76, or 38 more/less lucky for each side. Italy were 7.9% ‘luckier’ (more efficient) than the Spanish.

So to conclude were Italy lucky to draw against Spain? – In short, Yes… but only marginally, in relation to the Denmark and Netherlands game.

If Mario Balotelli had actually managed to get his shot away this would have evened this statistic up further still, providing Casillas had made the resultant save. This would have bought the totals to 972 and 1028 in the same balance of luck and a 5.7% luck differential.

SEE LINKS AND COMMENTS BELOW (click speech bubble top right) for a more comprehensive understanding behind the rationale and analysis of PDO on the Dutch Eredivisie and English Premier League using the same analysis method with additional outcomes such as futuristic prediction:

@11tegen11 http://11tegen11.net/?p=1731

@jameswgrayson http://jameswgrayson.wordpress.com

TikiTaka Football www.thepathismadebywalking.wordpress.com

All statistics taken from FourFourTwo Euro 2012 Stats Zone